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A Fictional Tale of Unintended 
Consequences 
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR WERTHEIMER* 
James A. Henderson, Jr.† 
Aaron D. Twerski‡ 
Professor Wertheimer has provided a provocative 
article,1 an ironic tale of unintended consequences. She claims 
that, prior to the Products Liability Restatement, American 
courts rejected the notion that manufacturers should be held 
liable for not designing or warning against unknowable product 
risks. In similar fashion, pre-Restatement case law insisted 
that design defect claims be judged by a negligence-like risk-
utility balancing test. She acknowledges that the Restatement 
accurately reflects the law on both of these issues. But here is 
the rub. Wertheimer claims that the Restatement, by firmly 
taking the majority position on these issues, inadvertently 
served as a wake-up call to American courts, reminding them 
that they had abandoned the true religion of strict liability and 
had slipped back to negligence norms. This, she says, has 
resulted in a post-Restatement backlash with courts scurrying 
back to implement true strict liability. By accurately describing 
what courts had been doing, the Restatement is having exactly 
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Princeton University; L.L.B. 1962, L.L.M. 1964, Harvard University 
 ‡ Newell DeValpine Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1962, Beth 
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 1 See Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, The Third 
Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 891 
(2005).  
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the opposite effect from what its supporters anticipated. Talk 
about unintended consequences! 
We are gratified that Professor Wertheimer confirms 
that the Restatement captures the thrust of developing case 
law. That is what it is supposed to do. However, the rest of her 
story about a backlash taking place in the courts is pure fiction. 
Make no mistake—Professor Wertheimer would very much like 
such a palace revolt to occur. But it has not happened and will 
not take place in the future. The positions that Professor 
Wertheimer and a few others have advocated for years have, 
for good reason, been rejected by the overwhelming majority of 
courts and scholars. 
I. IMPUTATION OF KNOWLEDGE OF UNKNOWABLE RISKS 
The view that foreseeability of risk should be irrelevant 
as to whether a manufacturer should bear liability for defective 
design and failure to warn was the subject of short-lived but 
serious debate early in the products liability era.2 However, 
when actually faced with the question of whether to hold a 
manufacturer liable for scientifically unknowable risks, court 
after court has said “No.”3 Wertheimer cites two cases to 
support her view that a revolt on this issue is afoot—one from 
Wisconsin4 and the other from Montana.5 Wisconsin has long 
been the lone star state in our products liability law, marching 
to its own, sometimes quite peculiar, drummer.6 The Montana 
court acknowledges that it rejects both Section 402A and the 
Third Restatement.7 On the other side of the issue, Wertheimer 
does admit in a footnote that Massachusetts, relying on the 
  
 2 See generally Symposium, The Passage of Time: The Implications of 
Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (1983). 
 3 For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the case law and 
academic commentary, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m 
and reporters’ notes at 101-07 (1998). 
 4 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 743-51 (Wis. 2001). 
 5 Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1144-47 (Mont. 1997). 
 6 See, e.g., Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 12 
(Wis. 1984) (finding that it was erroneous to instruct a jury in a crashworthiness case 
that in order to recover, a plaintiff must have suffered injuries over and above those 
that he would have sustained had the design not been defective). The Wisconsin view is 
contrary to section 16 of the Product Liability Restatement and is inconsistent with the 
majority of case law throughout the country. See, e.g., Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 
761 A.2d 477, 481 (N.H. 2000). See also Greiten v. LaDow, 235 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Wis. 
1975) (“[T]here may be recovery for the negligent design of a product even though it is 
not unreasonably dangerous in the 402A sense.”) (erroneously labeled as concurring 
opinion since four members of a seven member court voted for the concurring opinion). 
 7 Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1142, 1147. 
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Products Liability Restatement, recently reversed its earlier 
position applying strict liability without foreseeability.8 But she 
does not tell the reader that in doing so the court said that it 
had been “among a distinct minority of States that applies a 
hindsight analysis to the duty to warn. . . . The goal of the law 
is to induce conduct that is capable of being performed. The 
goal is not advanced by imposing liability for failure to warn of 
risks that were not capable of being known.”9 
Professor David Owen in his excellent new hornbook on 
the law of Products Liability puts the issue nicely. He says that 
“but for a few rogue jurisdictions, American products liability 
law, like the law of most of Europe and Japan, no longer holds 
manufacturers responsible for unknowable product risks. The 
rise and fall of the duty to warn of unforeseeable hazards has 
played a decisive role in the more general rise and fall of ‘strict’ 
products liability in America . . . .”10 A decision from a renegade 
jurisdiction and another from a court that rejects both the 
Second and Third Restatement do not constitute a revolt. They 
represent hardly a ripple in literally an ocean of authority to 
the contrary. 
II. RISK-UTILITY V. CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AS THE TEST 
FOR DEFECTIVE DESIGN 
It is no surprise that Professor Wertheimer is a fan of 
the consumer expectations test and views the Restatement 
requirement that in most cases plaintiff must establish a 
reasonable alternative design as reneging on the promise of 
true strict liability. The support for her position is terribly thin. 
First, she argues that rejecting consumer expectations as an 
independent grounds for establishing liability in design defect 
cases was a clever method of insulating manufacturers from 
liability for unknowable risk. One would think that any fair 
application of the consumer expectations test would have 
pointed in the opposite direction. Consumers would be hard put 
to demonstrate an expectation that a product would protect 
against risks that were unknowable or would incorporate 
alternative designs that were not contemplated by any 
manufacturer at the time of sale. Indeed, a rather famous early 
  
 8 Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 911 n.68 (citing Vassallo v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 910, 922-23 (Mass. 1992)).  
 9 Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23. 
 10 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 10.4, at 700 (2005).  
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consumer expectations case took that very position. In Bruce v. 
Martin-Marietta Corp.,11 an airplane manufactured by the 
defendant crashed into a mountain, causing seats in the 
passenger cabin to break loose from their floor attachments 
and block the exit. More than half the passengers were trapped 
in the airplane and died in the ensuing fire. Although the seats 
conformed to existing standards when the plane had been 
manufactured seventeen years earlier, plaintiffs submitted 
affidavits from a recognized expert that airplane seats in 
common use on the date of the accident would have remained 
in place and thus would have allowed the passengers to escape. 
The court rejected the claim that a plane, sold seventeen years 
before the accident, failed to meet consumer expectations for 
safety. In upholding summary judgment for defendant, the 
Tenth Circuit said: 
A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the safety features 
which are incorporated in automobiles made today . . . . Plaintiffs 
have not shown that the ordinary consumer would expect a plane 
made in 1952 to have the safety features of one made in 1970.12 
Returning to her thesis that courts that have faced the 
design defect issue post-Restatement have opted for the 
consumer expectations test, Professor Wertheimer trots out 
Wisconsin13 and Kansas14 as two states whose case law has 
soundly rejected the Restatement test. Neither Wisconsin nor 
Kansas represents a backlash to the Restatement. In our 
Reporters’ Note to the Restatement, we discuss both the 
Wisconsin and Kansas case law and recognize that both follow 
the consumer expectations test.15 It hardly comes as a surprise 
that these two states have continued their past allegiance to 
that test. They certainly do not support her thesis of a 
backlash. The new Restatement merely gave them a forum to 
express their strong allegiance to the minority view. 
Conspicuously absent from the Wertheimer article is citation to 
a whole host of decisions applying risk-utility balancing and/or 
the reasonable alternative design standard to design defect 
  
 11 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying Oklahoma law). 
 12 Id. at 447. 
 13 Werthemier, supra note 1, at 927-28, 929-31 (citing Green v. Smith & 
Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 742, 743-51, 754-55 (Wis. 2001)). 
 14 Werthemier, supra note 1, at 931-35 (citing Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 
P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000)). 
 15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d and reporters’ 
notes at 67, 76 (1998). 
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litigation in the post-Restatement era.16 In actual fact, these are 
the states that had been embracing a risk-utility approach to 
product design, and they have expressed no backlash sentiment 
whatever. Nor is Wertheimer’s statement that the Restatement 
completely eliminates consumer expectations from the test for 
defective design accurate. Section 2, Comment h says quite 
clearly that consumer expectations “may substantially 
influence or even be ultimately determinative on risk-utility 
balancing.”17 Admittedly, several states allow a two-pronged 
test for defective design.18 A plaintiff can establish liability 
under either consumer expectations or risk-utility. But, those 
cases make it clear that the consumer expectations test can 
work only when a product fails to perform its intended 
function.19 When trade-offs have to be considered, risk-utility 
must be employed.20 The Restatement does not disagree. It 
allows a plaintiff to draw an inference of defect when common 
sense indicates us that the injury would ordinarily occur as a 
result of product defect.21 In short, risk-utility balancing is alive 
  
 16 See, e.g., Wankier v. Crown Equip. Co., 353 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(applying Utah law and requiring plaintiff to prove “safer, feasible alternative design”); 
Peck v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 237 F.3d 614, 619 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Michigan 
law and upholding summary judgment for defendant due to plaintiff’s failure to 
present sufficient evidence of reasonable alternative design); Cohen v. Winnebago 
Indus., Inc., 2000 WL 299459 at *4 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying South Carolina law and 
holding that “providing evidence of the existence of an alternative safer, feasible design 
is part of the plaintiff’s product liability case under South Carolina law); Rypkema v. 
Time Mfg. Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 687, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Under New York law, in a 
design defect case a plaintiff is required to prove the existence of a feasible alternative 
[design] which would have prevented the accident.”); Jeter ex rel. Estate of Smith v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (W.D. Pa. 2003) 
(requiring plaintiff to prove “a feasible alternative design”); Jones v. Nordictrack, Inc., 
550 S.E.2d 101, 103-04 (Ga. 2001) (citing the Third Restatement § 2 and 
acknowledging that under risk-utility standards, “[t]he ‘heart’ of a design defect case is 
the reasonableness of selecting from among alternative product designs and adopting 
the safer feasible one.”); Wright v. Brooke Group, Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 
2002) (adopting reasonable attempt in design standard for defective design). 
 17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998).  
 18 See, e.g., Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 307-08 (Cal. 1994); 
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333-34 (Conn. 1997). 
 19 See, e.g., Soule, 882 P.2d at 307-08; Chicago Pneumatic Tool, 694 A.2d at 
1333-34. 
 20 See, e.g., Soule, 882 P.2d at 307-08; Chicago Pneumatic Tool, 694 A.2d at 
1333-34. 
 21 Section 3 of the Third Restatement provides: 
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a 
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a 
specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff: 
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; 
and 
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other 
than product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution. 
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and well. A true consumer expectations test remains as it was, 
the darling of a small minority of states. 
III. CATEGORY LIABILITY 
Wertheimer saves her guns for her long-standing 
concern, the rejection by the Restatement of category liability.22 
By requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design, the 
Restatement rejects the notion that courts should perform 
macro risk-utility balancing and declare products that cannot 
be made safer and whose warnings adequately portray risks 
attendant to their use to be defective. She says that the goal of 
requiring a reasonable alternative design was clearly 
retrogressive in that “[u]nder the [] Restatement, 
manufacturers would only be liable for products with curable 
dangers, and never for product designs that could not be 
changed to reduce or eliminate hazards.”23 We have two 
observations about her views. First, it is not true under the 
Restatement that courts are “never” to declare that a product 
category fails risk-utility norms. Section 2 Comment e 
specifically addresses the possibility of liability without 
establishing a reasonable alternative design when a product 
has low social utility and a high degree of danger.24 Second, and 
  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 (1998). 
 22 See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category 
Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 
1429, 1442 (1994). 
 23 Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 934.  
 24 The text of comment e provides: 
Design defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonable design. Several courts 
have suggested that the designs of some products are so manifestly 
unreasonable, in that they have low social utility and high degree of danger, 
that liability should attach even absent proof of a reasonable alternative 
design. In large part the problem is one of how the range of relevant 
alternative designs is described. For example, a toy gun that shoots hard 
rubber pellets with sufficient velocity to cause injury to children could be 
found to be defectively designed within the rule of Subsection (b). Toy guns 
unlikely to cause injury would constitute reasonable alternatives to the 
dangerous toy. Thus, toy guns that project ping-pong balls, soft gelatin 
pellets, or water might be found to be reasonable alternative designs to a toy 
gun that shoots hard pellets. However, if the realism of the hard-pellet gun, 
and thus its capacity to cause injury, is sufficiently important to those who 
purchase and use such products to justify the court’s limiting consideration to 
toy guns that achieve realism by shooting hard pellets, then no reasonable 
alternative will, by hypothesis, be available. In that instance, the design 
feature that defines which alternatives are relevant—the realism of the hard-
pellet gun and thus its capacity to injure—is precisely the feature on which 
the user places value and of which the plaintiff complains. If a court were to 
adopt this characterization of the product, and deem the capacity to cause 
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more important, we challenge Professor Wertheimer to find a 
case where a court has actually found liability based on her 
notion that the product creates more risk than utility when 
there was no way to make the product safer. What products 
would she include on her list? Certainly not productive 
machinery. How about SUV’s or motorcycles? The authors will 
admit to a strong personal dislike for motorcycles. They are 
death traps on wheels. But, would any court consider, even for 
an instant, declaring these products to be defective because 
they disturb a jury’s notion that they score too high on the 
misery scale? And why not alcoholic beverages? The societal 
toll taken by alcohol is mind-boggling. Is it because martinis 
are too deeply ingrained in our culture? That leaves only 
tobacco. But here, too, courts have not taken on the issue of 
cigarettes as a defective product. The cases have proceeded 
under either failure to warn or fraud and misrepresentation, 
not under the theory that cigarettes themselves are per se 
unreasonably dangerous.25 For reasons that we have detailed 
elsewhere, American courts have avoided product category like 
the plague.26 The Restatement reflected and continues to reflect 
the overwhelming consensus on this issue. There is no 
backlash. None whatsoever. 
IV. THE RESTATEMENT IS NEITHER PRO-DEFENDANT NOR 
PRO-PLAINTIFF 
Professor Wertheimer and a handful of other critics 
portray the Third Restatement as pro-defendant. We would 
urge them to read both the Restatement and the developing 
case law more carefully. A strong case can be made that 
plaintiffs have utilized the Restatement and the positions it 
espouses more successfully than defendants. Examples abound. 
  
injury an egregiously unacceptable quality in a toy for use by children, it 
could conclude that liability should attach without proof of a reasonable 
alternative design. The court would declare the product design to be defective 
and not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of danger posed 
by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible social 
utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts, 
would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the product. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998). 
 25 See, e.g., Williams v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 49 (Or. Ct. App. 
2002) (proceeding under fraud theory). 
 26 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American 
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1263, 1300-14 (1991). 
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(1) Warnings Cannot Cure a Defective Design. One of 
the unfortunate legacies of Restatement, Second, Comment j 
was that a product whose dangers are adequately warned 
against is not defective in design.27 The authors and others 
found this position untenable. The Third Restatement puts this 
issue to rest. Section 2, Comment l says that “when a safer 
design can reasonably be implemented and risks can 
reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption of the safer 
design is required over a warning that leaves a significant 
residuum of such risk.”28 Several high-profile cases have taken 
this position much to the chagrin of manufacturers who sought 
to absolve themselves from liability because they had 
thoroughly warned against the dangers.29 
(2) An Inference of Defect May be Drawn Without Proof 
of Specific Defect. Courts had questioned the applicability of 
the negligence res ipsa doctrine to strict liability cases.30 The 
Restatement takes the position that res ipsa is fully analogous 
and that one can draw an inference of defect when the incident 
that harmed the plaintiff was of a kind that ordinarily occurs 
as a result of product defect.31 Plaintiff need not establish 
whether the defect stemmed from design or from faulty 
manufacture and thus is not required to introduce a reasonable 
alternative design to establish a prima facie case of defect.32 
This is another provision in the Restatement upon which courts 
have relied to the great advantage of plaintiffs.33 
  
 27 Section 402A, comment j provides: 
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be 
read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use 
if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably 
dangerous. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965). 
 28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. l (1998).  
 29 Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 334-37 (Tex. 
1998); Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Lewis v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967, 982 (N.J. 1998). 
 30 Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying 
Illinois law). The court held: 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur teaches that an accident that is unlikely to 
occur unless the defendant was negligent is itself circumstantial evidence 
that the defendant was negligent. The doctrine is not strictly applicable to a 
product liability case because unlike an ordinary accident case the defendant 
in a products case has parted with possession and control of the harmful 
object before the accident occurs. 
Id. 
 31 See text of § 3 supra note 21. 
 32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998). 
 33 See, e.g., Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 N.E.2d 252, 254-55 (N.Y. 
2003); Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 723 A.2d 45, 57 (N.J. 1999). 
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(3) Violation of Safety Statutes and Regulations is 
Dispositive for Plaintiffs; Compliance is Not Dispositive for 
Defendants. Section 4 of the Third Restatement takes a one-
sided position. Violation of statute or regulation renders a 
product defective. On the other hand, compliance with a 
statute or regulation is not dispositive. A defendant may 
introduce evidence of compliance but compliance does not 
preclude a finder of fact from a finding that a product is 
defective. 
(4) Product Distributors Owe Post-Sale Duties to Warn. 
Section 10 of the Third Restatement sets forth the structure for 
the imposition of a post-sale failure to warn. Some courts have 
resisted recognizing a duty to warn of after-discovered risks 
when the product was not defective at time of sale.34 Once again 
courts have relied on the factors set forth in Section 10 and will 
recognize a post-sale duty when the facts indicate that the 
factors have been met.35 By creating a coherent structure the 
Restatement has allayed the fears that a post-sale duty to warn 
will result in unbridled liability. 
(5) Plaintiffs Receive the Benefit of the Doubt in 
Crashworthiness Cases. For years courts debated whether a 
plaintiff who could not establish the amount of increased 
damages caused by a defect in an auto that rendered it 
uncrashworthy could recover from a defendant who caused 
some add-on injury to that which the plaintiff would otherwise 
have suffered.36 Section 16 of the Restatement takes the 
position that once plaintiff has proved that a defect caused 
some increased harm but the full extent of the harm cannot be 
determined, the auto manufacturer is liable for the entirety of 
the damages. We are pleased that every court that has faced 
the issue post-Restatement has adopted Section 16.37 
  
 34 See, e.g., McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 429 (5th Cir. 
2001) (applying Texas law); Modelski v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 707 N.E.2d 239 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 35 See, e.g., Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 693-96 (Iowa 1999) (adopting 
§ 10); Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 867 (Mass. 2001) (adopting § 10). 
 36 For a review of the authority pro and con on this issue, see the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 16 cmt. d and reporters’ notes at 243-53 
(1998). 
 37 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1219-20 (Alaska 1998); 
Lally v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 36-37 (Mass. Application. Ct. 
1998); Poliseno v. Gen. Motors Corp., 744 A.2d 679, 686 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2000); Green v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205, 214-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998); cert. denied, 718 A.2d 1210 (N.J. 1998); Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 761 
A.2d 477 (N.H. 2000). 
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The list goes on. In drafting the Restatement, we did not 
seek to trade off one issue against the other. We endeavored 
only to reflect the law as it was developing and to ask ourselves 
whether the result was fair. In a Restatement that has twenty-
one sections and one hundred and thirty-three comments, it is 
not surprising that some courts will differ on one or another 
rule or comment. But the world is not as Professor Wertheimer 
would have her readers see it. As intriguing as her ironic tale 
of unintended consequences may be, it is an imaginative work 
of fiction. 
 
